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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a family of rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems
with multiple sources called Kruskal sharing rules. This family is characterized by cone-
wise additivity and independence of irrelevant trees. We also investigate some subsets of
this family and provide axiomatic characterizations of them. The first subset is obtained
by adding core selection. The second is obtained by adding core selection and equal
treatment of source costs.
Keywords: minimum cost spanning tree problems, multiple sources, Kruskal sharing
rules, axiomatic characterizations.
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1 Introduction
Consider a problem where a group of agents is interested in goods provided by several suppliers
or sources. To be served, the agents must be connected directly or indirectly to the suppliers
which means that they incur a cost. Agents also want to be connected to all sources. This
may be motivated by safety issues. For example, suppose that agents are interested in an
electricity grid which connects them to several power plants. If they are connected to all
power plants, then they are able to safely consume electricity even if one or more plants
suddenly fail to support their demands. There could also be situations in which each source
provides a different resource (water, electricity, Internet connection, etc.) and agents are
interested in all of them.
In our model we first have to find the least costly structure (a tree) that connects all
the agents to the sources directly or indirectly, taking into account that agents want to be
connected to every source. Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957) propose algorithms for selecting
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the least costly tree in the classical model, where there is a unique source. Such algorithms
can also serve their purpose in the case of multiple sources with the same good characteristics
as the polynomial computation time. Some authors have studied related problems that are
difficult from a computational point of view. For instance, Granot and Granot (1992) study
the fixed cost spanning forest problem; Farley et al (2000) study how to compute the spanning
tree that minimizes the sum of the distances from each source to every other node, Gouveia
and Martins (1999) the capacitated minimal spanning tree problem, and Gouveia et al (2014)
study hop constrained Steiner trees with multiple root nodes.
Once such a tree is obtained, its associated cost has to be shared among the agents. The
many papers that have studied this issue in classical minimum cost spanning tree problems
include Bird (1976), Kar (2002), Dutta and Kar (2004), Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007),
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010),Trudeau (2012), and Bergantin˜os and Go´mez-Ru´a (2015).
But there are few papers for the case of multiple sources. Rosenthal (1987) assumes that all
sources provide the same service and agents want to be connected to at least one of them.
He associates a cooperative game with this problem and studies the core. Kuipers (1997)
considers situations where each source offers a different service and each agent states which
subset of sources he wants to be connected to. He also considers a cooperative game and
studies the conditions under which the core is non empty. Bergantin˜os et al (2018) consider
the same situation as in this paper. They extend several definitions of the folk rule (Branzei et
al (2004), Tijs et al (2006), Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007), and Bergantin˜os et al (2010,
2011)), one of the most prominent rules in the classical model, to this new framework and prove
that they all provide the same allocation. Bergantin˜os and Navarro-Ramos (2019a, 2019b)
extend the definition of the folk rule through a painting procedure studied by Bergantin˜os et
al (2014) in the classical model and give a characterization.
Sometimes it is better to study a family of rules rather than focusing on a particular one.
In classical minimum cost spanning tree problems there are several sets of rules that contain
the folk rule as a particular element of the set. The two sets closely related to our results
here are the following: The first is the set of obligation rules introduced in Tijs et al (2006)
and studied later in Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009) and Bergantin˜os and Kar (2010). The
second is the set of generalized obligation rules studied in Bergantin˜os et al (2010, 2011), which
contains the set of obligation rules as a subfamily. It should be mentioned that both these
sets are defined through Kruskal’s algorithm and characterized using different properties.
In this paper we consider several families of rules, all of them containing the folk rule,
and study which properties they satisfy. The property of independence of irrelevant trees
says that if two problems share a common minimal tree with the same cost in all arcs, then
the rule should allocate the same cost to each agent in both problems. Cone-wise additivity
demands that the rule should be additive on cones. Both these properties have been widely
studied in classical minimum cost spanning tree problems. In Theorem 1 we characterize the
set of rules that satisfy both properties, which we call Kruskal sharing rules because they
are computed through Kruskal’s algorithm. A sharing function states the number of arcs
that each agent has to pay for each partition of the set of agents and sources. We associate
a Kruskal sharing rule with each sharing function as follows. At each Stage s of Kruskal’s
algorithm an arc is selected. The cost of that arc is divided between the agents according
to the sharing function. Each agent must pay the proportion of the cost of the arc selected
at Stage s given by the difference between the sharing function in the partition induced by
the arcs selected by the algorithm before Stage s, minus the sharing function in the partition
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induced by the arcs selected at Stage s. When the issue is restricted to classical minimum cost
spanning tree problems the family of Kruskal sharing rules contains the family of generalized
obligation rules, and hence the family of obligation rules.
The set of Kruskal sharing rules is so large that some rules belonging to it may not be
very appealing. For example, a rule where the cost of the minimal tree is paid entirely by a
single agent would belong to this set. Thus, we add new properties in order to narrow the set
of rules and omit those unappealing rules. The next property considered is core selection (the
rule should select an element in the core). Even though the core could in general be empty, in
our problem it is always non-empty, so we can claim this property. Theorem 2 characterizes
the set of rules satisfying all three properties. We obtain that such rules are associated with
sharing functions in which each group of agents has to pay, at most, the cost of the arcs that
they need to be connected to all sources. Restricting to classical minimum cost spanning tree
problems leads to this set of rules containing the family of obligation rules.
The three properties considered above are extensions of well known properties of classical
minimum cost spanning tree problems to our setting. The next property that we consider is
equal treatment of source costs. This is specifically defined for our setting. It says that if the
cost between two sources increases, then all agents’ payments should be affected by the same
amount. Theorem 3 characterizes the set of rules satisfying all four properties. We obtain
that such rules are associated with sharing functions defined as follows: Given a partition
of the set of agents and sources, the arcs needed to join two elements in the partition that
contain sources are divided equally among all agents, while the arcs needed to join elements
in the partition with sources with those without sources are divided among the agents in the
element without sources. When we restrict the issue to classical minimum cost spanning tree
problems it emerges that this set of rules contains the family of obligation rules.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces minimum cost spanning tree
problems with multiple sources. Section 3 defines the family of Kruskal sharing rules and
provides an axiomatic characterization of it. Section 4 presents and characterizes several
subsets of the family of Kruskal sharing rules.
2 The model
Consider a network whose nodes are elements of a set N ∪M , where N = {1, ..., |N |} is the
set of agents and M = {s1, ..., s|M |} is the set of sources. Respectively, |N | and |M | denote
the cardinality of N and M . For each N and M , a cost matrix C = (cij)i,j∈N∪M represents
the cost of a direct link between any pair of nodes. It is assumed that cij = cji ≥ 0 for each
i, j ∈ N ∪M and cii = 0 for each i ∈ N ∪M . Since cij = cji for each i, j ∈ N ∪M , we will
work with undirected arcs {i, j}. Let CN∪M be the set of all cost matrices over N ∪M . Given
C,C ′ ∈ CN∪M , C ≤ C ′ if cij ≤ c
′
ij for all i, j ∈ N ∪M . Similarly, given x, y ∈ R
N , x ≤ y if
xi ≤ yi for each i ∈ N .
A minimum cost spanning tree problem with multiple sources, or a problem, is defined by
a triple (N,M,C), where N is the set of agents, M is the set of sources, and C is the cost
matrix in CN∪M . Given a subset S ⊂ N , we denote by (S,M,C) the restriction of the problem
(N,M,C) to the subset of agents in S. The classical minimum cost spanning tree problem, or
the classical problem, corresponds to the case where M has a single element, which is denoted
by 0.
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Given a network g and a pair of distinct nodes i, j ∈ N ∪M , a path from i to j in g is a
sequence of distinct arcs gij = {{is−1, is}}
p
s=1 such that {is−1, is} ∈ g for each s ∈ {1, 2, ..., p},
i = i0, and j = ip. For each i, j ∈ N ∪M , i and j are connected in g if there exists a path
from i to j in g. A cycle is a path from i to i with at least two arcs. A tree is a network
where there exists a unique path from i to j for any i, j ∈ N ∪M .
For each network g, S ⊂ N ∪M is a connected component if (1) for each i, j ∈ S, i and
j are connected in g and (2) S is maximal, i.e., for each i ∈ S and each j /∈ S, i and j are
not connected in g. We define P (g) = {Sk(g)}
n(g)
k=1 as the partition of N ∪M in connected
components induced by g. Given i ∈ N ∪M we denote by S(P (g), i) the element of P (g) to
which i belongs to. Let P (N∪M) be the set of all partitions over N∪M and P = {S1, ..., S|P |}
be a generic element of P (N ∪M). For each P, P ′ ∈ P (N ∪M), P is finer than P ′ if for each
S ∈ P , there exists T ∈ P ′ such that S ⊂ T . For each P, P ′ ∈ P (N ∪M), P is 1-finer than
P ′ if P ′ is obtained by joining two elements of P , i.e., if P = {S1, ..., S|P |} and P is 1-finer
than P ′, then there exists Sk, Sk′ ∈ P such that P
′ = P \ {Sk, Sk′} ∪ {Sk ∪ Sk′}.
For each problem (N,M,C) and each network g, the cost associated with g is defined as
c(N,M,C, g) =
∑
{i,j}∈g cij . When there is no ambiguity, we denote it by c(g) or c(C, g). A
minimal tree for a problem (N,M,C) is a tree t such that c(t) = min{c(g) : g is a tree}. A
minimal tree does not have to be unique, but it always exists for any problem. Such tree can
be obtained, for instance, through Kruskal’s algorithm (1956). Let m(N,M,C) be the cost
of any minimal tree in (N,M,C).
We define the irreducible problem associated with a problem (N,M,C) following Bird
(1976). Let (N,M,C) be a problem and t be a minimal tree in (N,M,C). We define the
minimal network (N,M,Ct) associated with t where ctij = max
{k,l}∈gtij
{ckl} and g
t
ij denotes the
unique path in t from i to j. It is well known that Ct is independent of the chosen t. Then, we
can define the irreducible problem (N,M,C∗) of (N,M,C) as the minimal network (N,M,Ct)
associated with any minimal tree t. We say that C∗ is the irreducible matrix.
After obtaining a minimal tree, the second issue addressed is how to divide its cost
m(N,M,C) among the agents. A (cost allocation) rule is a map f that associates with
each problem (N,M,C) a vector of cost shares f(N,M,C) ∈ RN such that
∑
i∈N
fi(N,M,C) =
m(N,M,C).
3 Kruskal sharing rules
This section defines a family of rules obtained by means of Kruskal’s algorithm. At each stage
the cost of the arc selected by Kruskal’s algorithm is paid by the agents following the so called
sharing functions. This family of rules is inspired by the family of generalized obligation rules
for classical problems introduced in Bergantin˜os et al (2011).
Kruskal’s algorithm constructs a minimal tree by sequentially adding the cheapest arc
in the network taking care not to form cycles. Formally, let A0(C) = {{i, j} : i, j ∈ N ∪
M and i 6= j} and g0(C) = ∅.
Step 1: Take an arc {i, j} ∈ A0(C) such that cij = min
{k,ℓ}∈A0(C)
{ckℓ}. If there are several
arcs satisfying this condition, select one of them. Let
{
i1(C), j1(C)
}
= {i, j}, A1(C) =
A0(C) \ {i, j} and g1(C) =
{
i1(C), j1(C)
}
.
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Step p+1 (p = 1, . . . , |N |+|M |−2): Take an arc {i, j} ∈ Ap(C) such that cij = min
{k,ℓ}∈Ap(C)
{ckℓ}.
If there are several arcs satisfying this condition, select one as before. Two cases are possible:
1. If gp(C)∪{i, j} has a cycle, then go to the beginning of Step p+1 with Ap(C) obtained
from Ap(C) by deleting {i, j}, that is, Ap(C) = Ap(C) \ {i, j}, and gp(C) the same.
2. If gp(C)∪{i, j} has no cycles, then take
{
ip+1(C), jp+1(C)
}
= {i, j}, Ap+1(C) = Ap(C)\
{i, j}, gp+1(C) = gp(C) ∪
{
ip+1(C), jp+1(C)
}
, and go to Step p+ 2.
This procedure ends in |N |+|M |−1 steps, the minimum number of arcs needed to connect
all agents to all sources. The algorithm leads to a tree g|N |+|M |−1(C) which is not necessarily
unique. When there is no ambiguity, we write Ap, gp, and {ip, jp} instead of Ap(C), gp(C),
and {ip(C), jp(C)} respectively.
A sharing function α is a map that associates with each partition P = {S1, ..., S|P |} ∈
P (N ∪M) a vector α(P ) ∈ RN such that
∑
i∈N
αi(P ) = |P | − 1.
The interpretation of α is inspired by the generalized obligation functions for classical
problems introduced in Bergantin˜os et al (2011). Assume that agents in the same element of
P are connected with one another, while agents in different elements of P are not. If all agents
want to be connected to all sources, then |P | − 1 more arcs must be constructed. For each
i ∈ N , αi(P ) represents the number of arcs that agent i has to pay and can be interpreted as
a measure of the remaining responsibility of agent i.
Given a sharing function α the associated rule fα is defined as follows. For each problem
(N,M,C) and each i ∈ N ,
fαi (N,M,C) =
|N |+|M |−1∑
p=1
cipjp [αi(P (g
p−1))− αi(P (g
p))].
At each stage of the Kruskal algorithm, an arc (ip, jp) is added to the network. Each
agent pays the difference between his sharing function before the arc was added and the
corresponding function afterwards.
f is a Kruskal sharing rule if there is a sharing function α such that f = fα.
In the next proposition, we prove that Kruskal sharing rules are well-defined.
Proposition 1 Given a sharing function α, fα is a rule and it does not depend on how the
arcs are selected according to Kruskal’s algorithm.
Proof. First1 it is proved that fα is a rule, namely
∑
i∈N
fαi (N,M,C) = m(N,M,C). It is
possible to prove that the cost of each arc {ip, jp} is completely allocated among the agents
in N at each step of the Kruskal algorithm
Bergantin˜os et al (2017) prove that the rule fo
∗
(as defined in that paper) is well-defined.
Using arguments similar to those used there, it can be proved that fα does not depend on
how the arcs are selected according to Kruskal’s algorithm.
1Because of a suggestion of the Associate Editor and in order to short the paper we only give the idea of
the proofs without making the computations. We do the same for the rest of the proofs of the paper.
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Remark 1 As a consequence of Proposition 1, for each sharing function α, and each problem
(N,M,C), the allocation fα(N,M,C) can be computed in polynomial time.
Bergantin˜os et al (2010, 2011) introduce generalized obligation rules in classical problems.
Kruskal sharing rules restricted to classical problems induce a family of rules that contains the
family of generalized obligation rules. As a consequence, Kruskal sharing rules also contain
the family of obligation rules introduced in Tijs et al (2006).
Next we provide an axiomatic characterization of the family of Kruskal sharing rules. The
following properties are extensions of well-known properties in classical problems.
Independence of irrelevant trees (IIT). Given two different problems (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′)
that share a common minimal tree t such that cij = c
′
ij for each {i, j} ∈ t, then f(N,M,C) =
f(N,M,C ′).
This property requires the cost allocation chosen by a rule to depend only on the arcs
that belong to a minimal tree. This axiom is introduced in Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga
(2007) and also studied in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010) under the name of reductionism.
An equivalent definition for this property is that for each problem (N,M,C), f(N,M,C) =
f(N,M,C∗).
Additivity is a standard property in the literature. In our case additivity says that if there
are two problems (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′) then, f(N,M,C+C ′) = f(N,M,C)+f(N,M,C ′).
There is no rule in classical problems that satisfies this property, so there is no rule in the
multiple source case that satisfies this property either.
In classical problems there are two versions of additivity. Cone-wise additivity studied, for
instance, in Norde et al (2004), Bergantin˜os and Kar (2010), and Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2010), and constrained additivity studied, for instance, in Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2009)
and Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009). Under independence of irrelevant trees, the two
properties are equivalent. We use independence of irrelevant trees in all our characterizations
here, so our results can be obtained under both additivity properties. Thus, we only present
one of them.
Cone-wise additivity (CA). Let (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′) be two problems satisfying that
there exists an order σ : {{i, j}}i,j∈N∪M,i<j →
{
1, 2, ...., |N∪M |(|N∪M |−1)2
}
such that for all
i, j, k, l ∈ N ∪M satisfying that σ{i, j} ≤ σ{k, l}, then cij ≤ ckl and c
′
ij ≤ c
′
kl. Thus,
f(N,M,C + C ′) = f(N,M,C) + f(N,M,C ′).
Norde et al (2004) prove that every classical problem can be written as a non-negative
combination of classical problems where the costs of the arcs are 0 or 1. Even this result it is
not mentioned in the text because proofs have been simplified, it will be used in several parts
for making such computations.
We now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 1 A rule f satisfies CA and IIT if and only if f is a Kruskal sharing rule.
Proof. Let f be a Kruskal sharing rule, then there exists a Kruskal sharing function α such
that f = fα. Making some computations we can prove that fα satisfies CA and IIT .
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We now prove the reciprocal. Let us consider an allocation rule f that satisfies CA
and IIT . Given a partition P = {S1, S2, ..., S|P |} ∈ P (N ∪ M), we define the function
α(P ) = f(N,M,CP ) where cPij = 0 if i, j ∈ Sk for some k ∈ {1, 2, ..., |P |} and c
P
ij = 1
otherwise. Making some computations it is possible to prove that α is a sharing function
satisfying f = fα.
The axioms used in this theorem and the other theorems of the paper are independent2.
4 Characterizations of other families of rules
The set of Kruskal sharing rules is quite large and contains some rules, such as fα
1
, which are
not very appealing. In this section we characterize several subsets of Kruskal sharing rules
by demanding properties in addition to the original family. We first characterize the set of
Kruskal sharing rules that satisfy core selection. Then we characterize the set of rules that
satisfy core selection and equal treatment of source costs (if the connection cost between two
sources increases, all agents must be affected by the same amount). Finally, we show that if
symmetry is added to the previous characterization the folk rule is obtained.
We now introduce the well known property of core selection, which is a stability property
that states that no group of agents should pay more than the minimal cost of connecting them
to all the sources using only their locations. This means that agents in the coalition have no
incentives to build their own minimal tree. Formally,
Core selection (CS). Given a problem (N,M,C), a rule f satisfies CS if for each S ⊂ N∑
i∈S
fi(N,M,C) ≤ m(S,M,C).
Next we prove that a Kruskal sharing rule fα satisfies CS if and only if, given a partition
P and a coalition S ⊂ N , the sum of the sharing function of the members of S is less than or
equal to the number of arcs that they need to construct to connect all their components in P
to all the sources.
Theorem 2 A rule f satisfies CA, IIT , and CS if and only if f is a Kruskal sharing rule
fα where α is a sharing function that satisfies the requirement that for each P ∈ P (N ∪M)
and each S ⊂ N, ∑
i∈S
αi(P ) ≤ |Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩ (S ∪M) 6= ∅| − 1.
Proof. We first prove “⇒”. By Theorem 1 we know that there exists a sharing function α
such that f = fα. Since f satisfies CS, making some computations it is possible to prove
that the statement of the this theorem holds.
2Because of a suggestion of the Associate Editor and in order to short the paper we have removed the proof
of this statement.
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We now prove “⇐”. By Theorem 1 we know that fα satisfies CA and IIT . Making some
computations it is possible to prove that fα satisfies CS.
The next corollary is a straightforward consequence of the previous result.
Corollary 1 The core of a minimum cost spanning tree with multiple sources is non empty.
Tijs et al (2006) define the family of obligation rules in classical problems. It is straight-
forward to show that, in classical problems, obligation rules are a subset of the family of rules
characterized in Theorem 2.
Bergantin˜os et al (2011) characterize obligation functions with CA, CS, and strong cost
monotonicity (if some connection costs increase, no agent ends up better off) in classical
problems (Theorem 2 (a)). Strong cost monotonicity implies IIT , so Theorem 2 can be seen
as a generalization of that result.
The three properties considered so far (IIT , CA, and CS) are extensions of well known
properties of classical problems to our setting. We now consider a property specifically defined
for our setting. The idea is very simple: if the cost of the connection between two sources
increases, then all agents should be affected by the same amount.
Equal treatment of source costs (ETSC). For each pair of problems (N,M,C) and
(N,M,C ′) such that there exist a, b ∈ M satisfying that cab < c
′
ab and cij = c
′
ij otherwise,
then for each i, j ∈ N
fi(N,M,C
′)− fi(N,M,C) = fj(N,M,C
′)− fj(N,M,C).
The next theoerem characterizes the set of rules satisfying ETSC and the properties
considered in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 A rule f satisfies CA, IIT , CS, and ETSC if and only if f is a Kruskal sharing
rule fα where α is a sharing function that satisfies that for each P ∈ P (N ∪M) and each
i ∈ N
αi(P ) =


|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N |
if S (P, i) ∩M 6= ∅
|Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| − 1
|N |
+ xi if S(P, i) ⊂ N
where for each Sk ∈ P such that Sk ⊂ N ,
∑
j∈Sk
xj = 1.
Proof. We first prove “⇒”. By Theorem 1 we know that f(N,M,C) = fα(N,M,C).
Consider a partition P = {S1, ..., Sµ, .., S|P |} such that Sk ∩M 6= ∅ when k ≤ µ and Sk ⊂ N
when k > µ. Note that |Sk ∈ P : Sk ∩M 6= ∅| = µ.
Let us define the following sequence of problems {(N,M,Cr)}r=1,2,...,µ where C
1 = CP
and for each r > 1, Cr is obtained from Cr−1 by decreasing the connection cost between two
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sources in the following way. Consider ar−1 ∈ Sr−1 ∩M and a
r ∈ Sr ∩M . Then c
r
ar−1ar
= 0
and crij = c
r−1
ij otherwise. Making some computations over the sequence of problems it is
possible to prove that the statement of this theorem holds.
We now prove “⇐”. Since α satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2, we only need to prove
that fα satisfies ETSC. Let (N,M,C) and (N,M,C ′) be in the conditions of the definition
of ETSC.Assume there exists a minimal tree t in (N,M,C) such that {a, b} /∈ t. Thus, t is
also a minimal tree in (N,M,C ′) with exactly the same costs. Since fα satisfies IIT we have
that fα(N,M,C) = fα(N,M,C ′).
Assume that {a, b} ∈ t for every minimal tree t in (N,M,C). Let us denote by T the set
of trees in (N,M,C) that do not contain {a, b}. We define,
x = min
t∈T
c(N,M,C, t)−m(N,M,C) and
A = {{i, j} ∈ t : cab < cij < c
′
ab}.
Making some computations it is possible to prove that fα satisfies ETSC by considering
the following cases: c′ab − cab ≤ x and A = ∅; c
′
ab − cab ≤ x and A 6= ∅; and c
′
ab − cab > x.
Bergantin˜os et al (2018) prove that the folk rule in the multiple source case is the only
rule that satisfies CA, IIT, CS, ETSC, and symmetry (symmetric agents, in terms of their
connection costs to the rest of the agents and the sources, should pay the same). Thus, the
folk rule is the only symmetric rule in the family characterized in Theorem 3. Besides it
coincides with the Kruskal sharing rule associated with the following α. For each i ∈ N,
αi(P ) =
{
µ−1
|N | +
1
|Sk|
if i ∈ Sk with k > µ
µ−1
|N | otherwise.
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